An insightful analysis of the sources of failure in wars, although the approach holds promise for more general application to management in business. [355.480904]Forget for the moment all the business literature that tried to appear deep and subtle by applying writings of Sun Tzu or Alexander the Great to business management. Their focus on the enemy - that is, the competition - and exploiting his weaknesses to gain victory seemed to appeal to business fantasy rather than the mundane challenges of keeping everything running smoothly. Is military strategy even appropriate to apply to business? It is clear that war and military management present great challenges because the risk of failure involves much more than simply the financial health of the enterprise itself. At the same time, military management can, or should be able to, rely on tighter chains of command and an ability to marshal resources if they are needed.
Yet, business does present questions that need some innovative answers. How, for example, could the Edsel be explained? or New Coke? why did money center banks allow themselves to be stuck in the collapse of the market for CDOs? why did the domestic auto industry nearly die? Not all of these can be explained by costs structures or market forces. At times, it is necessary to look at the decision-making style of the people leading the organization.
The authors analyze military collapses form the last 75 years. After first rejecting analyses based on the psychological or temperamental profile of the man in charge (a variation of the Great Man approach), analysis of the institutional culture, or even the society that failed, they present three principal sources of failure. These are:
- Failure to learn. This is the refusal to look at lessons learned in analogous situations. Their example is American antisubmarine warfare in 1942. The horrific losses within the U.S. Merchant Marine fleet in the Battle for the Atlantic were costly in lives and materiel. The British had developed an effective strategy for convoys and for antisubmarine warfare during their years in the war. Their success, the authors contend, was not the result of new technology, but of developing an organizational structure that allowed the RAF to make use of all intelligence available and to disseminate it immediately to units that needed it. It would take some months before the U.S. could do the same with its antisubmarine air patrols.
- Failure to anticipate. This is not failure to foresee an unknown future, but the failure to take reasonable precautions against a known hazard. The authors analyze the failure of Israeli forces to anticipate the Yom Kippur War. This was not a failure alone of intelligence, that is, a misreading of the facts at hand and a lack of curiosity among Israeli senior officers concerning the data available, but also a failure to comprehend the strategic views of the adversaries. It could be summarized as overconfidence in understanding the situation confronting the IDF.
- Failure to adapt. As events unfold, little can be expected to continue as planned; opportunities present themselves or new information becomes available. The authors analyze the British generals' failure to adjust their plans in the terrible Gallipoli campaign of 1915. In the landings on Suvla Bay on April 25, British command failed to recognize a critical opportunity of light resistance on one of the three beaches in comparison to that on the other two. There was no command to press forward in the area of no resistance. Troops eventually drifted back to the beach. The British forces on "Y" beach at Suvla Bay failed to exploit the situation and became part of the forces pinned down in their trenches above the beach. A similar opportunity would not come again. Compare this with the landing on Utah beach in 1944, when it became clear that U.S. forces had landed at the wrong place on a lightly defended area. To quote their commanding officer, BG Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., the opportunity meant that they would "start the war from right here."
There is nothing to prevent combinations of these three failures and the authors examine two cases of such catastrophic failure: the rout of the Eighth Army in Korea in 1950 and the fall of France in 1940.
The analysis is greatly enhanced by the inclusion of an accountability matrix for each discussion. The matrix cells are defined by columns such as control and coordination, identification of goals, supply or means and rows are defined by levels within the organization from high command to units. Cell entries list errors or weaknesses with critical or serious failures marked. The tool itself should be adopted by others tasked with post hoc analyses of events.
This book will carry additional interest for anyone interested in military history, but it is recommended as an innovative approach to nonmilitary matters.
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